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ABSTRACT
In this paper, two models of individual labour supply are discussed. The
first one is the by now classical Hausman-type model with convex piece-
wise linear budget constraints, in which both random preferences and
optimization errors are incorporated by means of normally distributed
rendom variables. Estimated ccefficients are plausible but the model has
the shortcoming that unemployment for males is not captured and that the
simulated hours distribution misses the spikes in the sample distríbution
of working hours. Therefore, an alternative model is introduced which
explicitly takes into account demand side restrictions on working hours.
The difference with the standard model is the replacement of the
optimisation error by the assumption that each individual can choose from
a finite set of wage hours packages and either picks the job offer
yielding highest utility or decides not to work. It turns out that this
model captures the sample distribution of working hours very well, for
males as well as females. Wage and income elesticitiea according to the
two models are similar and in line with other recent findings in the
Netherlands. Dead weight loss calculations for the second model which
explicitly take the hours restrictions into account, imply that the dead
weight loss is much smaller than as calculated with the standard model.
~ We are grateful to Robert Moffitt, Peter Kooreman and the participants
of the Wingspread conference on 'The effect of taxation on labour supply
in industrialized countries' for helpful commenta. We thank the
Organisation for Strategic Labour Market Reaearch for kindly making the
data available for use in this research. Financial support by the
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Reaearch ia gratefully
acknowledged by the second author.- 1 -
1. Introduction
Due to the pioneering work of Jerry Hausman, the treatment of piece-
wise linear convex budget constraints in the analysis of labour supply is
now a rather standard practice. See, for example, Hausman (1980, 1981),
Blomquist (1983) and Moffitt (1986). In Section 2 of this paper we
replicate this type of enalysis on data for the Netherlands. Both the
labour supply of women and of inen ia studied for a crosa-section of Dutch
households drawn in 1985. Some simulations besed on the estimation results
are performed to calculate elasticities and dead weight losses.
Although the standard model comea out with plauaible coefficients and
the results are well in line with earlier findings in the Netherlands, a
simple simulation reveals that varioua features of the data ere not
reproduced. In particular, the model overpredicts participation by men,
whereas for women the participation of various education groups is badly
tracked by the model. A comparison of the diatribution of houra worked in
the sample with the houra diatribution generated by the model makes clear
that the simulated distribution ia far too amooth. In particular, the
model misses spikes at fourty houra a week for males and at 40, 20, and 32
houra a week for females.
All this suggests that, at leest in the Netherlands, the easumption
underlying the model that obaerved hours mainly reflect the outcome of
unrestricted choicea by individuals is incorrect. In Section 3, we
introduce a simple reduced form model of the demand aide of the labour
market, in which employera offer wage houra packeges and each individual
can chooae from e limited number of auch offers. put of theae ~oba, the
one yielding the highest utility level is picked, or the individusl
decides not to work. It is also posaible that aomeone is unemployed
becauae he or she has received zero offers.
It turns out that this adjustment of the atandard model makea a
dramatic difference in terma of the explanation of male participation and
the fit of the generated hours diatribution to the obaerved dlstribution
in the sample. Interestingly, in the calculation of elasticities we obtain
results that are of the same order of magnitude ea ín the atendard model.
The reaulta of the extended model auggeat that for femalea the
diatribution of desired hours ia aituated to the left of the diatribution-z-
of hours offered by the employera. Thia mismatch between both
distributions is a poasible explanation of the low participation rate of
women in the Netherlenda in comparison with most other developed
countriea. If women could all work their desired number of houra, the
participation rate of married females would rise from about 40 x to about
80 x, although moat of thes would like to work 16 hours a week or less.
Dead weight loss calculationa for the extended model which explicitly
take the houra reatrictiona into account, auggest that the welfare losa is
much amaller than as calculated with the standard model.
All theae reaults ahould be interpreted with caution. Although the
model in Section 3 in some respects certainly performs better then the
model in Section 2, it dcea not yield a perfect description of labour
supply behaviour in the Netherlanda. Teat reaults ahow that
miaspecifícation ia atill present. In Section 4, some possible future
extensiona end improvementa of the model are suggested. The main
contribution of the preaent paper ia perhaps not a reliable conclusion
about 'the true labour supply elasticities' or a guideline for tax
reforms. Much more, it is another warning againat the temptation to atick
to one particular model, without carefully investigating whether this
model is able to explain certain featurea of the data to a sufficient
extent.
2. Cooon model
Starting point of the analyais is a modified version of the model
introduced by Hauaman (1981):
hi~ ~ Pwi~ . bNi~ . X~ac , é~
h~ ~ 0 íf hl~( 0
~ hi~ if Hi-1,J~ hij~ Hij '
(2.1)
i~l,...s (2.2)
~ Hi~ if hi~) Hij end hi41,j( Hi~ , i~i,...e-1-3-
where
- T if h8~) Hs~
h~ - 0 if h~ i v~~ 0 or hf - 0 (2,3)
-h~.v~ ifhf.v~~0andh~ ~0
hi~ - utility maximizing number of working houra for individual j
on the line containing budget segment i
wi~ - virtual hourly wage rate of individual j on budget segment i
Ni~ - virtual non-labour income of individuel j for budget segment i
X~ - vector of exogenous demographic variables of individusl j
e~ - random variable representing stochastic preferences
hf - preferred number of working hours
H1~- kink-points of the budget constraint (H0~-0, Ha~-T)
T - total time available
h~ - observed number of working houra of individuel j




the number of budget segments
a: parameters.
The main difference between this model and the one in the Hauaman (1981)
paper is that random preferencea (E~) are included in the constent term
rather than in the income coefficient p. The error terms (e~,v~)' ere
asaumed to be drawn from the bivariate normal diatribution with mean
(0,0)' and covariance matrix
oÉ 0
l 0 Qy J
The corresponding direct utility function end expenditure function
are given by
U(h.c) - -b h-bc-X'a-E - loBÍP-bh) (2.4) p-bh
and
e(w.u) ' {-e-Sw-uFP-~bw-b(X'm~t)}~bz (2.5)-4-
respectively, where c in (2.4) denotes conaumption and u in (2.5) denotes
the utility level. The direct utility function is defined and quasi-
concave on the set {(h,c); ~-bh)0}, which conteins the set {(h,c); h)0} if
p)0 and SCO. In this case the model is also coherent in the sense that
(2'1), (2.2) end (2.3) yield exactly one solution h~ for all e~ and v~
(cf Gourieroux et al. (1980) and Ven Soeat et el. (1988)).
Data and BstiDation reaulta
The data we used stem from a labour mobility aurvey carried out in
the Netherlanda in 1985 under auspices of the Organisation of Strategic
Labour Market Research (OSA). The aemple contains information on 849
familiea consiating of at least huaband and wife. Some sample statiatics
are mentioned in Table 2.1. The sample containa 315 families in which both
partners are employed, in 486 families only the husband ia employed and in
16 casea only the female works. In the remaining 32 families both partners
are unemployed. After tax wage rates of employed individuels were not
directly observed but constructed from hours worked and after tax labour
income. Before tax wage ratea were then calculated by using an
approximation of the Dutch income tax aystem. Some aimplifying asaumptions
were neceasary because the data-set did not contain all the necessary
information on deductables, health inaurance premiuma, etc.
Making use of the computed before tax wage ratea of workers, a before
tax wage equation allowing for the posaibility of aelection bias was
estimated for males and femelea aeperately. The explenatory variables used
were log(age) (LAGF7~! and LAGEF for males end fesales respectively),
log(age) aquared,
dummies referring to different education levels (fiDM and EDF), and
an index variable referring to the aector of education (F.DSECM and
EDSECF: 2ztechnical or buainess, lasemi-technical or semi-buaineas,
0-neither technical nor businesa).
Eatíuation reaulta sre mentioned in Appendix A. Making uae of actuel
before tax wage rates for workers and predicted before tax wage ratea for
unemployed individusls, for each peraon a convex piecewiee linear
approximation of the budget set was conatructed. Again, aimplifying-5-
assumptions due to lack of information were necessary. Minor non-
linearities and non-convexities due to e.g. threaholds in deductablea were
ignored, as well as unemployment benefits; only the basic system of at
moat eleven income brackets was explicitly taken into account.
Table 2.1. Sa~ple statiatics
Variable Mean St. dev. Minimum Maximum Number
~~ 1.18 0.37 0.69 2.30 849 (logarithm of family aize)
DCN~6 0.26 0.44 0 1 849 (dummy children younger than 6)
~c~ 3.65 0.26 3.00 4.14 849 (logarithm of age, male)
~o~ 3.58 0.27 2.89 4.11 849 (logarithm of age, female)
L2AGEM 13.38 1.87 8.97 17.17 849 (LAGEM-squared)
~~c~ 12.88 1.94 8.35 16.90 849 (LAOEF-squared)
~M 2.78 1.08 1 5 g49 (education level male)
~F 2.35 i.oi 1 5 849 (education level female)
~~M o.95 0.99 0 2 849 (education sector male)
snsscF o.29 0.70 0 2 849 (education sector female)
~TM . 15.97 5.80 6.87 59.47 801 (after tax wage rate, male)
wRATF 12.54 4.53 5.81
(after tex wage rate, female)~
39.38 331
w~ 27 90 1 80 8
(before tax wage rate, male)
. 3. .94 174.55 801
~TF . 19.27 8.06 7.35 60.65 331 (before tax wage rate, female)
~ . 42.07 6.70 4 71 801
(working hours per week, male)
HF ~27.29 12.52 2 60 331
(working hours per week, female)
Note: `: working individuals only
The model was eatimated by maximum likelihood uaing the algorithm of
Berndt et al (1974). The calculation of bivariate probabilities wae
beaed upon e formule given by Abramowitz and Stegun (1970), p. 940.
Estimation reaulta are given in Table 2.2.- 6 -
Table 2.2 Estisation results of the cam.on ~odel














0.51 (o.i7) i.29 (0.44)
-0.0055 (0.0035) -0.0080 (0.0039)
-i53 (104) -489 (203)
0.18 (1.77) -31.8 (7.0)
-0.94 (1.33) -21.4 (5.i)
i~ (58) 325 (120)
-i5.3 (7.9) -50.0 (17.3)
12.93 (0.49) i9.i9 (5.36)
~y 3.22 (1.40) i2.77 (3.23)
The estimates for the wege rate ccefficients are significantly
different from zero end imply that labour supply is fonrard bending. The
income effecta have the expected negative sign and for females, the
coefficient differs significantly from 0. Both the wage and the income
effect are stronger for femalea than for males. The impact of family
characteristics (family aize and the preaence of young children) is
inaignificant for males and strongly significant for femalea. The
estimates imply that, ceteris paribus, labour supply is maximal at 34 end
26 yeara of age for malea end femalea respectively. The estimated etandard
deviations of the random variables E and v are significantly different
from zero. For males in particular, random preferences seem to be the most
important aource of random variation of observed hours worked.
Sisulations and Co~putation of Dead fieight I.oea
Table 2.3 provides semple means and a simulation of the actusl i985
situation in order to see to what extent the model ia able to describe the
data. In this table, means of hours worked end average participatíon
probabilities are given for males and females divided into groups
according to aeveral different individuel characteriatica. Sample meens of
hours worked ( zerces included) in column 2 can be compared with aimulated
means (column 3) in which both sources of random variation are taken into-~-
account (i.e. for each individuel 10 different random drawings of e and v
are used). The resulta ahow for inatance that for femalea, the model
captures the differences in hours worked between people of different
levels of education to some extent but not completely. This may be a
consequence of the fact that education was not included as an explanatory
variable in the vector X of individual characteristics but it may elso be
due to the restrictive way in which hours are allowed to depend on the
wage rate. The differences in the average numbera of hours worked for
different age levels and family aizes appear to be well captured. For
males, there are hardly r y differencea left to be explained.
The other columns of Table 2.3 refer to participation probabilitiea,
i.e. the sample participation fraction (column 4), the aimulated fraction
if only random preferences are taken into account (column 5), end the
fraction with both sources of random variation taken into account (column
6). The numbers in coluan 5 may be interpreted as probabilitiea of desired
participation. Actual participation observed may differ from thia because
of demand side restrictions, measurement errora, euboptiosl behaviour,
etc, all the error sources included in v. For femalea, predicted
participation ia alightly larger than the observed participation in the
sample. Again, the fact that differences in preferences between femalea of
different education levele are not fully captured by the model becomes
apparent. For males, the model hardly appenrs to explain any non-
participation at all. Predicted participation exceeda 0.99~ for all
groups, whereas actuel participation in the saaple equsls o.944. This
shortcoming of the model may e.g. be due to the fact that fixed costs of
working are not incorporated or to the fact that demand side reatrictiona
(involuntary unemployment) are not explicitly taken into account.
Table 2.4 shows the consequences of a 10 X increase af all after tax
wage rates. The aggregate average nuvber of hours worked would increase by
6.6 x for females and 1.2 x for malea. In relative terma, the change 1s
similar for groupa with different education levels, age or fsmily aize.
':he relatively large increase of feoele working hours is partly explained
by the rise in the average participation probability of 5.6 x. For malea,
the simulated degree of participation wes already eleost equsl to one
before the wege increase and thus hardly changea. A siaulation of a 10 x
decrease of after tax wage ratea showa reaulta that are alsoat syuetric-a-
to the results shown in Table 2.4: The aggregate average of houra worked
falls by 6.3 X for females and 1.2 X for males. Zncome elesticities are
computed in the same w~y. A 10 X rise of all unearned incomes (virtusl
incomes due to the tax system excluded) leads to a fall in average hours
worked for males of only O.1 X. For females, the fall is 2.3 X, mainly
because the average participation probability falls by 2.1 X.
Whereas Table 2.3 contains information on average numbers of working
houra, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 refer to the actual and simulated distributions
of working houra. Frequencies of zero hours of work are not included in
the figures (these frequencies can be obtained from Table 2.3). The
figures present the actual ssmple diatributions for all males and all
females respectively and present two different aimulated hours
distributions: the distribution with ell sources of random variation taken
into account, i.e. the distribution of h3-s given by (2.3), and the
diatribution of the h~-s given by (2.2). The latter cen be interpreted as
the diatribution of desired working hours, since the errors included in
v~, which reflect several sourcea of deviations from optimal behaviour,
are not taken into account. The gap between desired hours frequencies and
simulated actual frequencies for females reflects involuntary
unemployment, sa far as explained by this model: A negative realisation of
v~ implies that someone who would like to work few hours a week dcea not
actually work. The probability of involuntary unemployment thua is a
strongly decreasing function of deaired labour supply.
The figures show that the model is not able to explain the spikes at
40 houra of work for males and females and at 20 houra of work for
females. This ia a uaual ahortcoming of labour supply models in the
Netherlanda which do not take into account an,y foros of houra restrictiona
and it motivates the explicit modelling of auch restrictiona. In Section 3
such a model will be discusaed.
The results of dead weight losa (DWL) calculations based on the
eatimation reaults are mentioned in Table 2.5. DWL was calculated ten
times for each individusl, with different random drawings of e. The random
variation through v was not taken into account. For a given individuel and
given E, h~ and corresponding conaumption c~ were determined uaing (2.1)
and (2.2). Then (2.4) and (2.5) were used to cospute the luap sum tax
which generates the same utility level as the actusl tax ayatem. ThP table-9-
contains the average DWL for groupa with different characteriatica, in
absolute terms (Dfl per week, col. 6) as well as in relative terma, i.e.
as a Fraction of the tax revenues in the original aystem (col. 7). The
average DWL is approximately 32.6 X and 30. 3 X for males and females
respectively of the average amount of taxes paid according to the actusl
system. As was to be expected, DWL is highest for people with large labour
supply, since their marginal tax rate is largest. For the same reason, one
would expect DWL for malea to exceed DWL for females. This is true in
absolute terms but not in relative terms, becauae the female'e own wage
elasticity ia larger than the male'e. The effect on hours worked of
changing the actusl tax eystem into a system of lump aum taxes is
illuatrated in columna 2 and 3 of the table, whích contain average
predicted numbers of working hours for the actual and the lump sum
system. The larger the differences between the numbera in these columns,
the larger are the dead weight losses. DWL was also calculated ignoring
rendom preference variation, i.e. with both e and v aet equal to 0. The
reaults were quite similar to thoae mentioned in Table 2.5.
Conclumion
The estimation resulta of the atandard model are aetisfactory in the
senae that ell parameter estimatea have the expected aigna. Moreover,
estimated wage end income eleaticitiea are largely in accordence with what
we would expect intuitively. On the other hand however, simulation of the
actual aituation and ín particular the figurea comparing sample
distributions with simulated diatributiona reveal important shortcomings
of the model: It dces not capture the apikes in the male end female hours
diatribution end it cannot explain non-participation emong malea. In order
to test the apecification of the model formally, it was also estimated
using information on employed individuels only (with e conditional
likelihood function). For malea ea well as femalea, some of the reaulting
paremeter eatimates were quite different from ti.e originel ones and
standard errors of Lhe eatimates were amaller inatead of larger.
Therefore, the formal Hauamen teat statiatics (see Hauaman, 19~8) were not
computed, but the miaspecification intuitively became more apparent. Theae
estimation results are mentioned in Appendix g, The figures ín thia- 10 -
appendix show that these estlmates still imply that the spikes in the male
and female hours distribution are not explained.
Several extensions of the model can be suggested to overcome the
shortcomings. In our opinion, the explicit incorporation of existing
demand aíde or institutional restrictiona on hours worked seems a very
important one, at least in the Netherlands. This approach is taken in the
remainder of this paper.
Table 2.3. Simulation of the actual 1985 situation
Nales 1 2 3 4 5 6
All males: 849 39.70 39.40 0.943 0.999 0.999
Fduc. level: 1 134 37.69 39.31 0.903 0.999 0.999
2 167 37.05 38.94 0.910 0.999 0.998
3 342 40.54 39.05 0.965 0.999 0.999
~4 206 41.75 40.42 0.961 i.ooo i.ooo
Age: ~ 30 154 39.60 39.09 0.955 0.999 0.999
30-39 300 40.83 40.40 0.96o i.ooo 1.000
40-49 225 39.96 39.94 0.924 0.999 0.999
~ 50 170 37.43 37.23 0.929 0.999 0.998
Family aize: 2 263 39.98 39.18 0.958 1.000 1.000
3 140 38.71 39.30 0.929 0.999 0.998
4 282 38.85 39.75 0.929 0.999 0.999
~ 5 164 41.52 39.25 0.957 0.999 0.999
Females
All femalea: 849 10.64 9.94 0.390 0.487 0.412
Fduc. level: 1 217 6.73 7.75 0.290 0.403 0.332
2 223 6.94 8.77 0.278 0.452 0.374
3 322 13.26 11.30 0.450 0.522 0.452
~ 4 87 20.18 13.38 0.701 0.660 0.557
age: i 30 226 20.35 18.25 0.593 0.709 0.637
30-39 296 7.84 8.34 0.334 0.445 0.372
40-49 212 7.66 5.71 0.330 0.388 0.306
~ 50 115 4.25 5.53 0.243 0.344 0.266
Femily aize: 2 263 23.32 21.30 0.711 0.821 0.741
3 140 6.71 7.64 0.329 0.486 0.390
4 282 5.65 5.24 0.277 0.371 0.289
~ 5 164 2.25 1.76 0.122 0.153 0.113
Explanation~
column 1: number in the semple
2: houra worked, sample mean
3: hours worked, aimulated
4: participation, sample
5: desired participation, aímulated
6: actuel participation, aimulated- 11 -
Table 2.4 Sisulation of a 10 x increase ot after tax wage rates
Males 1 2 3 4 5 6
All males: 849 39.70 39.89 0.943 0.999 0.999
Educ. level: 1 134 37.69 39.77 0.903 0.999 0.999 2 167 37.05 39.40 0.910 0.999 0.999
~ 4 206 4í0.~5 40.94 0.961 íO.ÓÓÓ
o,909 090
Age: ~ 30 154 39.60 39.53 0.955 0.999 0.999
30-39 3~ 40.83 40.88 0.96o i.o0o i.o0o
40-49 225 39.96 40.44 0.924 0.999 0.999
~ 50 170 37.43 37.74 0.929 0.999 0.999
Family size: 2 263 39.98 39.64 0.958 1.000 1.000
3 140 38.71 39.78 0.929 0.999 0.999
4 282 38.85 40.25 0.929 0.999 0.999
5 164 41.52 39.76 0.957 0.999 0.999
Females
All females: 849 10.64 10.59 0.390 0.513 0.434
Educ. level: 1 217 6.73 8.26 0.290 0.427 0.350
2 223 6.94 9.36 0.278 0.478 0.393
3 322 13.26 11.99 0.450 0.547 0.476
~ 4 87 20.18 14.35 0.701 0.691 0.595
Age: ~ 30 226 20.35 19.09 0.593 0.729 0.654
30-39 296 7.84 8.97 0.334 0.470 0.396
40-49 212 7.66 6.29 0.330 0.419 0.333
~ 50 115 4.25 5.98 0.243 0.372 0.290
Femily size: 2 263 23.32 22.23 0.711 0.837 0.762
3 140 6.71 8.36 0.329 0.524 0.424
4 282 5.65 5.81 O.z77 0.403 0.314
~ 5 164 z.25 2.04 0.122 0.174 0.126
Explenation:
column 1: number in the semple
2: hours worked, sample mean
3: hours worked, simulated
4: participation, sample
5: desired participation, simulated
6: actual participatíon, simulated- 12 -
Table 2.5 Dead weight loss calculations
Males 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A11 males: 849 39.39 45.88 191 253 62 0.33
Fduc, level:l 134 39.26 43-35 111 132 21 0.19
2 167 38.90 43.31 120 141 21 0.18
3 342 39-03 44.90 169 213 44 0.26
~ 4 206 40.45 51.25 336 489 153 0.45
Age: C 30 154 39-08 42.91 110 124 14 0.12
30-39 300 40.34 47.16 203 268 65 0-32
40-49 225 39.89 47.96 245 343 98 0.40
~ 50 170 37.32 43-58 171 225 54 0.32
Family size:2 263 39.20 44.40 155 187 32 0.21
3 140 39.31 45.54 181 236 55 0-30
4 282 39.78 46.93 210 280 70 0.33
~ 5 164 39-08 46.72 224 328 104 0.46
Females
All females: 849 9.33 11.11 16 21 5 0.30
Fduc. level:l 217 7.24 8.22 9 10 2 0.18
2 223 7.92 9.19 11 13 2 0.22
3 322 10.73 12.80 20 26 6 0.30
~ 4 87 12.92 17.01 36 53 16 0.45
Age: t 30 226 17.77 z0.74 32 38 7 0.21
30-39 296 7.65 9.56 16 24 7 0.44
40-49 212 5.20 6.18 6 8 2 0.31
~ 50 115 4.67 5.26 4 5 1 0.24
Femily size:2 263 20.75 24.63 41 52 11 0.26
3 140 6.75 8.17 10 14 5 0-53
4 282 4.54 5.46 5 8 2 0.46
~ 5 164 1.44 1.66 1 1 0 0.34
Explanation-
number in the sample
hours simulated, actusl tax system
hours simulated, lump sum taxea
taxes, actusl system (Dfl per week)
taxes, lump sum (Dfl per week)
dead weight losa (Dfl per week)
(dead weight loss)~(taxes actual system)- 13 -
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Figure 2.1 Distribution of working hours per week
Males, common model- 14 -
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Figure 2.2 Distribution of working hours per week
Females, common model- 15 -
3. A Model with Demand Side Restrictiona
In Section 2, e labour supply model was introduced that took into
account tax laws in describing the budget conatreint. In this section we
present s model which also explicitly captures demand side restrictions by
modelling the limited availability of jobs wíth different, distinct,
numbers of hours. Exemples of labour supply modela in which houra
restrictions and involuntary unemployment are taken ínto account are
Moffitt (1982), Ham (1982) and Blundell et ai. (1987). The model atudied
here is largely based on a paper by Dickens and Lundberg (1985).
The Model
The starting point is the common model, described in equations (2.1)-
(2.2). The error term v, representing emong other things deviations from
preferred numbers of hours due to demand side reatrictions, is omitted.
Inatead, we model demand aide restrictions by meana of diatributional
esaumptions about job offers. Another difference with the common model is
that the number of houra of work is no longer considered to be a
continuous variable, but a discrete one. In thia aection we consider
numbers of hours at 4-hour intervals, i.e. 0, 4, 8, etc. In what follows,
we uae the index .L to denote such hours points h. For example, ~C~O
correaponds with h30, ~zl with h-4, .i.s2 with h~8 and so on. For clarity of
presentation we omit both the index j, denoting the j-th individual and
the index i, denoting budget segment i(compare equation (2.1)).
We assume that employers offer joba with fixed numbera of houra.
Workers face the market diatribution of these employment opportunities.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the market diatribution of job offers ia
the aeme for all workera, such that the probabílity that one job offer
involves h~(~0) working hours is:
Pr[one job offer hzh~] s p~ , .lzl,,,,,m, (3.1)
Here m is the number of different values of working hours h~)0. An
individuel receivea N job offera which are not necessarily different, i.e.
he may for example receive N job offers all requiring 40 houra per week.- 16 -
The probability of this event (conditional on N) is pi0 (~C-10 corresponds
to h-40). The number of job offers an individual receives, N, is assumed
to be a drawing from a binomial distribution B(Nmax'Pof)' ~e maximum
number of job offera Nm~ ia fixed at 10.
In this context the labour aupply decision becomes a discrete choice
between N job offers, drawn from the market distribution of offers, or not
working:
h- hk iff U(hk,ck) ) U(h~,c~) (3.2)
for all .l in the range of received job offers and for ~-0. Here c~ is the
consumption level corresponding to h~. If there are no demand
restrictions, i.e. an individual cen choose any number of hours, then
(3.2) holds for all .L. In general, the individuel still maximizes utility,
but on a aubset of poasible numbers of hours only. For a non-worker this
subset m~y contain only one element, zero hours, because N is asaumed to
be a random variable of which zero is one of the poasible outcomes. In
this way the model diatinguishes between voluntary and involuntary
unemployment. The main idea is that an individual is only observed to work
hk()0) hours if he received at least one job offer hk and if he prefers
this job offer to sll different job offera he received and to
unemployment. The individusl ia unemployed if he prefera zero hours of
work to all job offers he received or if he received zero offers.
The likelihood contribution of a given observation ia a function of:
- parameters of the utility function (p, b, a-s, aE)
- probabilities of job offers with different numbers of hours
(Pks)
- the parameter detereining the number of job offers an
individual receives (Pof).
In this model there are three sources of randomness, namely:
- e, repreaentíng stochastic preferences,
- N, the number of job offera, end
- the offered numbera of houra.
C.et Rk(E,N) be the conditional probability of observing h-hk, for given e
and N(k~0,...,m). It ia atraightforward to determine Rk(e,N) from (3.2)
becauae if preferencea (i.e. e) are known, it ís easy to check for each-1~-
.i.~k whether U(hk,ck) exceeda U(h~,c~) or not. Since the taste parameter e
is not observed, the likelihood of observing h-hk hours given N can be
written as the mean of Rk(e,N):
L(h-hk~ N) - J f(e) Rk(e,N) de , (3.3)
where f is the density function of e(~ N(O,aÉ)).
For random N the likelihood function (3.3) ia given by:
N
max
L(h-hk) - ~ L(h-hk~ N) p(N)
N-0
(3.4)
where p is the probability function corresponding to B(N , P max of)'
Since L(h-hk~ N-0) - 0 if hk~0, for workers equation (3.4) turns into
Nmax
L(h-hk) - ~ L(h-hk~ N) p(N)
N-1
(3.5)
Since L(h-0~ N-0) - 1, equation (3.4) can be written for non-workers as
N
max
L(h-0) - p(0) 4~ L(h-0~ N) p(N)
N-1
(3.6)
Thus unemployment can either be due to the fact that no job offers are
received at ell or to the fact that all job offera received are lesa
attractive than not working. For more details about the model end the
likelihood function, see 1~ers and Woittiez (1988). The main difference
with the common model ia the fact that the error term v ia replaced by the
job offer mechanism. Thus, en alternative explenation ia given for
differences between actusl and deaired labour supply: Instead of assuming
that these deviations are random drawings from a normal distribution,
flexibility is added in the sense that correlation of deviationa from
desired behaviour with the dasired number of working hours is allowed for.
As in the common model, the diatinction between desired and actusl labour- 18 -
supply hinges strongly on identifying assumptions, since no information on
desired behaviour is used. In the extended model, the main identifying
assumption is that the job offer distribution dces not depend on
individual characteristics such as age, education, etc. Therefore,
conclusions about desired labour supply should be interpreted with
caution; eventually, desired hours are only introduced as a tool to create
a model which yields a reasonable description of the distribution oF
actual working hours.
Estimation Results
Table 3.1 presents estimation results of the model described above,
which is referred to as the extended model. It was estimated for males and
females seperately with the data set described in Section 2. As said
before, the number of hours in this model is assumed to be a discrete
variable. To each of the points with houra strictly greater than 0
corresponds a probability that this number of hours is offered. These
probabilities could be estimated freely, but to reduce the number of
parameters to be estimated we have set the probabilities of various points
equal to each other. We have for example assumed that jobs involving 4, 8,
12, or 16 hours per week are offered with the same probability. For the
exact distributional assumptions of job offers see the upper panel of
Table 3.1. The maximum number of hours offered is set equel to the sample
maximum of hours worked, i.e. ~2 for malea (m-18) and 60 for females
(m-15).
The number of job offers an individusl receives is e random drawing
from the binomiel distribution B(lO,Pof). The estimated value of Pof is 1
(upper bound) for males and 0.395 for females. This implies that a man
slways receives 10 offers, whereas a woman only receives about 4 job
offers on average. It follows from the numbers in Table 3.1 that according
to this model most job offera involve 40 or more hours per week. The
estimatea for p12-...-pm seem rather large, for both men and women, and
imply that almost everyone has the opportunity to work 48 hours or more.
These large numbers however do not necessarily imply that man,y people
actually work so many hours, since preferences are such that these offers
will rarely be accepted (see below).- 19 -
Table 3.1 Estimation resulta of the extended model
(Standard errors in parentheses)
job offersl)
Males Females
p1:...-Py (4.8.1z.i6) 0.0009 (0.0005) 0.012 (0.0039)
P5 (20) o.ooz (o.ool) 0.030 (0.001)
P6-P7 (24,28) 0.001 (0.0004) 0.015 (0.005)
pg (32) 0.003 (0.001) 0.050 (0.017)
P9 (36) 0.006 ~~.ool) 0.036 (0.oi3)
P10 (40) 0.297 (o.i32) o.3oz (0.083)
P11 (44) 0.309 (0.062) 0.130 (0.042)
p12-..-Pm (48....4m)2) 0.054 ( --- )2) 0.094 ( -- )2)
Pof 1.0 ( --- )3) 0.395 (0.143)
preferences
S (wage rate) 0.405 (0.242) 0.768 (0.243)
b (unearned income) -0.0007 (0.003) -0.0041 (0.0013)
aco(constant) -259. (109.) -172.1 (85.5)
allLOGFS) -o.i41 (1.733) -14.1 (3.1)
~.2(nGH~6) -0.899 (1.287) -9.03 (2.22)
m3ILAGE) 167. (61.) 126.0 (49.9)
a4(L2AGE) -23.7 (8.4) -19.8 (7.2)
dE(rendom pref.) 11.91 (0.98) 7.71 (1.96)
Notea-
1) the number(s) of working hours to which the probabilities correspond
are given in parentheses.
2) m-18 for males and m-15 for femalea; pi2-..:pm is determined by the
other probabilities because probabilities add up to one. Therefore, no
standard error is computed.
3) aince the estimate ia at its upper bound, no stendard error ia
computed.-zo-
The lower panel of Table 3.1 contains estimated parameter values of
the utility function. It is atriking that for females all estimated values
are smaller in absolute value than the corresponding ones in the common
model, but they are still sígnificant. The presence of children atrongly
reduces (ceteris paribus) the female's desired number of working hours,
whereas for malea, family characteristics only play a minor role. The age
profiles of preferred hours do not differ much from those found in Section
2. Hours rise with age until about 32 years for men and 25 years for
women. There is a remarkable difference between the estimates for o for
E
females in the twc ~odela. Apparently, part of the variation in actual
houra worked which the common model explained by different preferences, is
ascribed to differences in hours restrictíona by the extended model.
Simulations
Table 3.2 providea simulation reaults of the extended model. This
table is comparable with Table 2.3, on the understanding that an extra
column is added with aimulated deaired working hours. The main differences
between the simulations with the common model (Table 2.3) and the extended
model (Table 3.2) are:
- Differences in hours worked between people of different levels of
education are better explained by the extended model (but not
completely).
- Simulated desíred participation for females is much larger in the
extended model than in the common model, implying that according to the
extended model femalea are atrongly restricted in their choice: There
are not enough jobs with a limited number of working hours (See also
Figure 3.2 below).
- Unlike the common model, the extended model is capable of explaining
the 6X non-participation of males. Since aimulated preferred
participation is close to one, non-participation is explained by demand
aide restrictions: All males receive 10 job offers, but some of them
only receive offers involving an unattractive (large) number of working
hours and thus they prefer not to work.- 21 -
Teble 3.2 Simulatim oP the actual 1985 aituation
Males 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
All meles: 849 39.70 37.01 40.25 0.943 0.999 0.944
Fduc. level: 1 134 37.69 36.06 39.37 0.903 0.998 0.931 2 167 37.05 36.41 39.70 0.910 0.999 0.936
~ 4 206 410.75 3ï.95 41.13 0.96i o.999 0.958
Age: ~ 30 154 39.60 36.54 39.80 0.955 0.999 0.937 30-39 300 40.83 38.55 41.51 0.960 0.999 0.960 40-49 225 39.96 37.53 40.74 0.924 0.999 0.952 i 50 170 37.43 34.05 37.78 0.929 0.998 0.912
Family size: 2 263 39.98 36.36 39.67 0.958 0.999 0.935 3 140 38.71 36.69 39.96 0.929 0.999 0.940
4 282 38.85 37.62 40.78 0.929 0.999 0.952
? 5 164 41.52 37.29 40.50 0.957 0.999 0.948
Females
All females: 849 10.64 12.45 10.89 0.390 0.825 0.396
Educ. level: 1 217 6.73 10.18 8.01 0.290 0.753 0.313
2 223 6.94 11.75 9.69 0.278 0.822 0.366
3 322 13.26 13.50 12.35 0.450 0.850 0.435
~ 4 87 20.18 16.05 15.72 0.701 0.925 0.534
Age: ~ 30 226 20.35 18.74 20.11 0.593 0.928 0.636
30-39 296 7.84 11.34 9.17 0.334 0.816 0.354
40-49 212 7.66 9.60 6.50 0.330 0.794 0.283
? 50 115 4.25 8.24 5.27 0.243 0.707 0.238
Family size: 2 63 23.32 20.72 22.82 0.711 0.976 0.717
3 140 6.71 11.59 8.59 0.329 0.878 0.356
4 282 5.65 9.34 5.87 0.277 0.805 0.269
~ 5 164 z.25 5.30 2.35 o.i22 0.575 0.133
Explanation-
column 1: number in the sample
2: actual hours worked, sample mean
3: preferred hours, aimulated
4: actusl hours worked, aimulated
5: Participation, sample
6: deaired participation, aimulated
7: actusl participation, simulated-22-
Table 3.3 Si~ulation of a lOx increase of after tax rege ratea
Males 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
All males: 849 39.70 37.48 40.64 0.943 0.999 0.949
Educ. level: 1 134 37.69 36.49 39.75 0.903 0.999 0.936
2 167 37.05 36.84 40.08 0.910 0.999 0.941
3 342 40.54 37.57 40.72 0.965 0.999 0.950
~ 4 206 41.75 38.47 41.55 0.961 1.000 0.963
Age: ( 30 154 39.60 36.94 40.15 0.955 0.999 0.942
30-39 3~ 40.83 39.oi 41.88 0.960 l.ooo 0.964
40-49 225 39.96 38.01 41.13 0.924 0.999 0.957
~ 50 170 37.43 34.54 38.25 0.929 0.998 0.920
Family size: 2 263 39.98 36.79 40.05 0.958 0.999 0.941
3 140 38.71 37.16 40.36 0.929 0.999 0.946
4 282 38.85 38.10 41.17 0.929 0.999 0.957
~ 5 164 41.52 37.78 40.90 0.957 0.999 0.953
Females
All females: 849 10.64 13.18 11.75 0.390 0.849 0.421
Educ. level: 1 2i7 6.73 10.81 8.71 0.290 0.779 0.335
2 223 6.94 12.46 10.52 0.278 0.846 0.392
3 322 13.26 14.25 13.24 0.450 0.873 0.460
~ 4 87 20.18 i6.97 16.97 o.7oi o.942 0.568
Age: ~ 30 226 20.35 19.45 21.03 0.593 0.939 0.658
30-39 296 7.84 12. u io.io 0.334 0.842 0.383
40-49 212 7.66 10.35 7.33 0.330 0.824 0.311
~ 50 115 4.25 8.84 5.92 0.243 0.734 0.260
Family aize: 2 263 23.32 21.45 23.88 0.711 0.980 0.740
3 140 6.71 12.35 9.61 0.329 0.898 0.387
4 282 5.65 io.io 6.71 0.277 0.835 0.297
~ 5 i64 2.25 5-93 2.79 0.122 0.620 0.15z
Explanation.
number in the sample
actuel houra rorked, sample mean
preferred hours, simulated




Table 3.4 siiulation of an increase of the maber of part-ti~e job offere
Males 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
All males: 849 39.70 37.01 38.80 0.943 0.999 0.968
Educ. level: 1 134 37.69 36.06 37.89 0.903 0.998 0.959 2 167 37.05 36.41 38.23 0.910 0.999 0.963
3 34z 40.54 37.11 38.89 0.965 0.999 0.968 ~ 4 206 41.75 37.95 39.71 0.961 0.999 0.976
Ase: ~ 30 154 39.60 36.54 38.34 0.955 0.999 0.963 30-39 3~ 40.83 38.55 4o.i8 0.960 0.999 0.977 40-49 225 39.96 37.53 39.31 0.924 0.999 0.973 ~ 50 170 37.43 34.05 36.12 0.929 0.998 0.948
Family size: 2 263 39.98 36.36 38.18 0.958 0.999 0.962
3 140 38.71 36.69 38.50 0.929 0.999 0.965
4 282 38.85 37.62 39.37 0.929 0.999 0.972
~ 5 164 41.52 37.29 39.07 0.957 0.999 0.970
Females
All females: 849 10.64 12.45 11.54 0.390 0.825 0.486
Fduc. level: 1 217 6.73 10.18 8.90 0.290 0.753 0.399
2 223 6.94 11.75 10.58 0.278 0.822 0.461
3 322 13.26 13.50 12.80 0.450 0.850 0.523
~ 4 87 20.18 16.05 15.94 0.701 0.925 0.631
Aee: ~ 30 226 20.35 18.74 19.39 0.593 0.928 0.711
30-39 296 7.84 11.34 10.14 0.334 0.816 0.451
40-49 212 7.66 9.60 7.85 0.330 0.794 0.382
~ 50 115 4.25 8.24 6.54 0.243 0.707 0.326
Family aize: 2 263 23.32 20.72 21.87 0.711 0.976 0.798
3 140 6.71 11.59 10.08 0.329 0.878 0.475
4 z82 5.65 9.34 7.40 0.277 0.805 0.372
~ 5 164 2.25 5.30 3.35 0.122 0.575 0.190
Explanation:
column 1: number in the semple
2: actuel hours worked, sample nean
3: Preferred houra, aimulated
4: actual houra worked, eimulated
5: participation, semple
6: desired participation, aimulated
7: actual participation, simulated-z4-
The consequences of a lOX increase in all after tax wage rates are
presented in Table 3.3. It shows a small increase (1.OX) in hours worked
for men, and a larger increase (~.9X) for women. These results are similar
to those in the common model. It is interesting to see that for females
the elasticity of the actual number of hours worked with respect to the
own wage rate is larger than the corresponding elasticity of desired hours
(5.9X). This may be explained by the fact that the choice set is discrete:
Some femalea will not react at all if their wage rate increases, but for
others the discrete 'jump' may exceed the rise in preferred hours.
Apparently, the second effect slightly dominates the first.
Income elasticities are obtained in the same way. If unearned incomes
rise with lOX, male labour supply hardly changes. For females, actual
hours and participation decrease by 2.3X and 2.OX respectively. Preferred
hours and participation fall by 2.OX and 1.OX.
In a final simulation the consequences are studied of relaxing hours
restrictions in the sense that more part-time jobs are offered, i.e. jobs
involving 20 hours per week. According to the estímation results, the
probability that at leest one 20 houra a week job ís offered ia 2.3X for
males and 11.4X for females. Table 3.4 ahowa what happens if the value of
p5 (the probability that one offer involves 20 hours) is increased in such
a way that the probability of receiving at least one offer of 20 hours
becomes 50X. (For males, this implies p5-0.067, and as a conaequence
P12- "-P1H
is reduced to 0.045; for females it implies p5s0.168 and
P12- "-P15s0.0592). Hecause restrictions are relaxed, actusl numbers move
towards preferred ones. Thus many of those who prefer to work part-time
but either did not work or worked full time because there was no part-time
job opportunity, will now be able to find a 20 hours job. Non-
participation and full-time work will fall in favor of part-time work. For
males, the fall in the number of full-time workers dominates and average
working hours decreese for all age and education categories. 12.5X of all
males will chooae to work 20 hours a week. For females, the fall in the
number of people who do not work dominates and the average number of
working hours risea for all groupa. Non-participation falls by 15X and
23.5X of all women will work 20 houra.
The parameter estimatea in the lower panel of Table 3.1 were used to
simulate the distribution of preferred hours, given in Figures 3.1 and 3.2-25-
for men and women respectively. These figures can be compared with the
simulated hours distributiona without measurement or optimisation errora,
presented in Figurea 2.1 and 2.2. The two distributions are very aimilar
apart from differences due to the different desired partícipation
probabilities which we already discussed (See Table 3.2).
Combining the demand side of the model (i.e. the offers distribution)
end the supply side (preferred hours) one obtaína the distribution of
actual working hours such as it is simulated with the extended model.
Comparing the semple distribution of actual hours with the aimulated
diatribution shows that th~ extended model predicts an houra distribution
much more in line with the data than the common model. This improvement
must be attributed to the different distributional easumptions. By
easuming that both random variables in the common model are normally
distributed, one forces an houra distribution which ia too amooth. In the
extended model this is no longer the case.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 only displsy information about working
individuels. Let us now focus on the 61x non-participating femalea end
about 5.6z non-participating males. The extended model predicts a degree
of participation of reapectively 60.5x end 5.5X. Table 3-5 yields
information on how these numbera come about. In the first column the
simulated actuel hours dístribution is given, and in the second the
aimulated preferred diatribution. Only 1~.5X of the females prefer not
working to any other number of hours. The remaining 43x of predicted non-
participants is due to restrictiona on the demend side. A large number of
women, 54z, prefer to work between 4 and 16 hours per week. But jobs
requiring such low number of houre are rarely offered: The last column
contains the probability that the choice aet containa the nunber of houra
N
h~, i.e. 1-(1-PoE.p~) m~ (~E~l,...,m). This column again ahows that for
almoat everyone the choice aet containa the opportunity of working
full-time or more, but that many do not have the optíon of working part-
time. Intuitively, the fact that firms are reluctant to offer joba with
few houra a week might well be explaine3 by the exíatence of fixed
employer costs for each separate employee. Again however, it ahould be
atressed that thia interpretatíon hinges etrongly on the identífyíng
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for instance be the existence of fixed costs at the supply side of the
labour market, such as costs of child care, etc, which are not taken into
account in either the common or the extended model. These fixed costs make
it unattractive for an individual to work only a few hours. In the
extended model the rare occurrence of people working only a few hours is
explained by demand side restrictions.
Table 3.5 simuleted, actual preferred and offered hours distributions
(Probabilities x 100)
males females
hours(h~) actusl pref. offered actual pref. offered
0 5.58 0.11 0.9 60.44 17.45 -
4 0.07 0.20 0.9 2.40 11.19 4.6
8 0.10 0.54 0.9 2.50 15.50 4.6
12 0.13 1.24 0.9 2.47 16.32 4.6
16 0.17 2.59 0.9 2.31 1z.11 4.6
20 0.59 4.70 2.4 5.33 9.94 11.3
24 0.32 7.38 i.i 2.32 7.67 5.8
28 0.38 10.30 1.1 1.96 5.12 5.8
32 1.42 12.71 3.4 5.07 2.86 18.1
36 2.71 13.85 5.8 2.64 1.26 13.3
40 54.25 13.35 97.0 10.24 0.44 72.3
44 17.52 11.49 97.5 1.41 o.i2 42.0
48 5.29 8.73 42.5 0.50 0.02 34.1
52 4.46 5.88 42.5 0.23 0.00 34.1
56 3.16 3.53 42.5 o.io o.o0 34.1
60 1.96 1.89 42.5 0.04 0.00 34.1
64 1.09 0.90 42.5 0.02 0.00 34.1
68 0.55 0.38 42.5 0.01 0.00 34.1
72 0.25 0.22 42.5 0.00 0.00 34.1
Dead weight loss calculations
When dead weight losaes are calculated, restrictions on working
hours are uauslly ignored. Since the extended model explicitly takea these
restrictions into account, it seems natural to incorporate the hours
reatrictions also i;~ the calculation of DWL.
In order to understend the exact meaning of DWL in the context of
hours restrictions, let us first consider the case in which individual
preferences are known with certainty (i.e. e ia given) and the set oP job
offers is given, i.e. the individuel chooses the best point in the finite-29-
0 0 1 1 N N 0 i set {(h ,c ),(h ,c ),...,(h ,c )}, where h-0 and c denotea consumption
corresponding to hi according to the actual tax system. The two figures
below show what DWL may look like. Figure 3.3 refera to a person with a
choice set containing six points. The optimal choice is (h2,c2), as can be
see from the form of the indifference curve corresponding to utility level
U(h~,c2). Taxes paid will thus equal T. (Note that in the first tax
bracket no taxes are paid, ao the before tax wage rate equals wl, the
after tax (marginal) wage rate corresponding to the first bracket.) If the
tax aystem is replaced by a lump sum tax T, the individual will choose to
work more (i.e. h3 or h4) hours and hia utility level will increase. Let
c2~ be the consumption level defined implicitly by
U(h2,c2) - U(h~,c2~) (.)'2,....N) (3.7)
The dead weight loss is defined as the amount by which the lump aum muat
increase such that the optimal utility level - with hours restrictions
teken into account - according to the lump sum eystem equals U(h2,á ), so
DWL - Max {wlh~~ c~- c2~} - T
~s2, . ,x
(3.8)
In Figure 3.3, the maximum ia attained for j-3.
If in the case referred to by Figure 3.3 (h3.c3) and (h4,c4) were
omitted from the choice set, then DWI, would be zero. In that case, the
individual would still work h2 hours if the tax syatem was replaced by a
lump sum T.
Figure 3.4 refera to someone with a choice aet consiatíng of two
different pointa only. Confronted with the actuel tax system, this person
chooses not to work end pays no taxes, but atill the dead weight loss is
non-zero. Note thet in thia exemple DWL would be zero if houra worked
could be chosen freely, since in that ceae the individuel would work h'
hours end changing the tax system would have no effect. Thia example thua
showa that the presence of hours reatrictiona doea not necessarily imply
that DWL is smaller than it would have been if hours are chosen freely, as
might be thought intuitively.-30-
Figure 3.3 nead weight losa for a finite aet of job offera
OWL
Fi~uay 3.4 D~ad rsisht lop in caN ot noo-y~rticipatian- 31 -
It is straightforward to extend the examples given above to the
'general case' with preferences given by (2.4) with e known and given job
offers {(hD,cD),(hl,cl),...,(hN,cN)}: For i,~ E{o,...,N}, iCj, let ci~ be
defined by
U(hl'cl) ~ U(h~'ci~) (3.9)
An explicit expression for cl~ is easily derived from (2.4):
c1~- 1[{g-bh~}{U(hi,ci)alo (p-bh~)} f b hf-X'ac-e b2 g { }] (3.10)
Let (hl~,ci~) be the utility maximizing choice. The dead weight loas is
given by
~~ w
DWL - Max. {wlhfr cD- ci }-{wlhi . c0- ci} -
j-i , ..,N
- Max {w (h~-hi.) t ci- ci-~}, (3.11)
,)-i~, ..,N 1
If preferences or the set of job offers are not fixed, we essume
that the lump sum cen be adjusted exactly to each possible realisation of
the random preference term e and to each aet of job offers, and we are
intereated in the expectation of the dead weight losa. Let us first
consider the case that e is given but job offers are random. For i,j E
{O,l,...,m}, i~j, let
DWLi~ ~ {wl(h~-hi) . ci- ci~}, (3.12)
where ci is consumption corresponding to hi and ci~ ia defined in the aeme
way ea ci~ in (3.9). DWLi~ is the realisation of DWL if in case of the
actusl tax system the optimal choice is (hi,ci) and in case of lump sum
taxation the optimal choice is (h~,c~). Since DWLii~ 0 the expected dead
weight loss (conditional on e) ia given by
m m
E{DWL~e} - ~ F Pr[DWLsDWLi~] DWLi~
is0 j-1~1 (3.13)- 32 -
The probabilities Pr[DWL-DWL1~] can be calculated as follows: Let
41 -{kE{0,...,m}; U(hk,ck)CU(hi,ci)} (i-0,...,m) (3.14)
and
~i~-{kE{0,...,m}; k(i or DWLikCDWLi~} (i,jE{0,...,m},iCj) (3.15)
Thus, 41 corresponds to the offera which are not preferred to (hi,ci), and
D1~ corresponds to the offers which yield a dead weight loss that dces not
axceed DWL1~, conditional on the fact that (hi,ci) is the optimal choice.
Theref~-~e, DWL-DWLi~ if and only ip for each job offer (hk,ck) we have k E
41n ni~ and (hi,ci) as well as (h~,c~) are offered. For A C{O,l,...,m}
let
q(A) -(1-P ) a~ p p if 0 E A
of kEA`{0} of k
-0 ifOf~A
(3.16)
We avoid conditioning on the number of job offers N by interpreting the
Nm~- N"misaed job offers" ea offers of zero hours (which are of no
importance, since zero hours of work can be chosen anyhow). Thus if OEA
q(A) can be interpreted as the probability that one job offer belongs to







This implies that Pr[DWL-DWLif]-0 if U(hi,ci)(U(hO,cD) (i.e. OfL41) or if
U(hi,ci)CU(h~,c~) (i.e. j(C41). The expected dead weight loss can now be
found by substitution of (3.17) into (3.13).
Finally, the expectation hes to be taken with respect to e also:
E(DWL) r EE{E{DWL~E}} s J f(e) E{DWL~E} de. (3.17)
-m-33-
Since E{DWL~e} is a complicated function of e, it is not possible to
compute the expectation analytically. Therefore, Por each individuel 10
valuea E3 (ja1,...,10) are drawn randomly from a N(O,a6)-distribution and
10
E{DWL} is approximated by 10 ~ E{DW[.~e3},
jsl
Mean dead weight losses are given in Table 3.6, which can be
compared to Table 2.5. According to the extended model, DWL appeara to be
much smaller than according to the common model, for both males and
females. On averege, DWL in the extended model ia 10.7X of taxea paid for
males end 15.4X for females. In the common model these figurea were 32.6X
and 30.3X respectively. Since wage rate elasticities are approximately the
same in the two modela, the differencea must be due to the hours
restrictions. The average change in hours worked (the difference between
columns 3 end 2) for males is much smaller in the extended model than in
the common model, but for femalea this is not the case. Moreover, the
change from the actusl tex eystem to lump sum taxation in the model with
hours restrictions
described in the




has a poaitíve impact on participation ( the effect
example illuatrated in Figure 3.4), as cen be aeen from
Table 3.6. Particularly for females this seema to play
participation increases by 9.7X. However, the effect of
taxea paid is only amall, aince those who change from non-
to participation choose to work relatively few hours a week.
The extra tax revenues ahould mainly come from those who elready paíd a
large amount and apparently for these people the houra restrictiona play
the largest role.-34-
Table 3.6 Dead weight loss calculatio~s
Males
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
All males: 849 40.28 42.71 203 224 22 0.11 0.944 0.954
Educ. level:l 134 39.17 40.82 116 124 8 0.07 0.922 0.933
2 167 39.56 41.33 127 135 8 0.06 0.931 0.942
3 342 40.51 42.75 184 200 17 0.09 0.947 0.956
~ 4 206 41.21 44.98 351 402 50 0.14 0.963 0.974
Age: C 30 154 39.73 41.05 115 119 4 0.04 0.935 0.940
30-39 3~ 41.66 44.30 218 241 23 0.11 0.961 0.971
40-49 225 4i.13 44.08 259 293 34 0.13 0.961 0.969
~ 50 i7o 37.20 39.58 181 i99 18 o.io 0.898 0.917
Family size:2 263 39.54 41.45 161 i72 ii o.07 0.933 0.943
3 140 39.85 42.15 189 208 19 0.10 0.935 0.944
4 282 40.75 43.46 225 250 25 0.11 0.952 0.963
~ 5 i64 41.03 43.90 243 278 35 o.i5 0.955 0.965
Females
All females: 849 10.84 12.63 23 27 4 0.15 0.395 0.433
Educ. level:i 217 8.39 9.45 12 13 1 0.09 0.321 0.345
2 223 9.23 10.82 16 i8 2 0.13 0.354 0.391
3 322 12.37 14.18 27 30 3 o.i3 0.434 0.471
~ 4 87 15.43 19.46 57 71 14 0.25 0.533 0.615
ege: ~ 30 226 19.88 21.84 38 41 3 0.08 0.633 0.666
30-39 296 9.20 11.30 26 31 6 0.22 0.353 0.399
40-49 212 6.34 7.98 13 15 3 0.22 0.278 0.319
~ 50 115 5.59 6.51 8 9 1 0.13 0.247 0.270
Family aize:2 263 22.83 25.24 49 54 4 0.09 0.718 0.756
3 140 8.72 10.86 20 25 5 0.23 0.360 0.411
4 282 5.79 7.54 12 16 4 0.32 0.267 0.311
~ 5 164 2.11 2.67 3 4 1 0.25 0.125 0.142
Explanation-
number in the sample
hours simulated, actual tax eyatem
houra aimulated, lump sum Laxes
taxea, actuel syetea (Dfl per week)
taxea, lump sum (Dfl per week)
dead weight loas (Dfl per week)
(dead weight loss)~(taxea actuel syatem)
simulated participation, actusl tax ayatem
similated participation, lump sum taxea-35-
4. Conclusiona
In Sections 2 and 3, two models of individual labour aupply are
eatimated, both of them based on the linear Hauaman (1981) specification
and accounting for a piece-wise linear budget constraint. Although some of
the parameter estimatea aeem substantially different in the two models,
calculated elasticities are quite aimilar. In a surve paper, Theeuwea
(1988) discusses 8 other recent Dutch labour supply atudiea. He givea 8
wage rate elasticitiea for houra worked of women, ranging from 0.20 to
3.23 with a mean of 1.39. Compared to this, our elsaticitiea of 0.65 end
0.79 are low but not out of line. For malea, Theeuwes mentions 4 wage
elasticitiea, ranging from -0.25 to 0.27 with a mean of 0.07. Our values
(0.12 and 0.10) fit quite well in this range. The income elasticitiea that
we find are alao largely in accordance with previoua Dutch results. Dead
weight losa calculationa yield quite different reaulta for the two modela.
The DWL of 30X for femalea correaponda to valuea of 27x and 37x. which
were obtained by Gríft (1988) with Dutch 1983 data of married women. The
aubstantially different DWL's found in Section 3 ahould perhapa not be too
surprising, aince the DWL definition hingea atrongly on the atructure of
the model, i.e. on the demand aide restrictiona.
The introduction of the extended model is motivated by the fact
that the common model yields a poor description of the aemple diatribution
of working hours. The resulta, in particular Figurea 3.1 and 3.2,
unquestionably ahow that in thia reapect the model in Section 3 ia a
auccesa. This however doea not mean that it ia free of misapecification.
Several White teata for different Subvectora of the paremeter vector were
performed and generally the null-hypothesis of no miaspecification wes
rejected. Rejection wae atrongeat for the parameters referring to demand
aide restrictiona, intuitively auggeating that thia is where moat
misapecification ia located. On the other hand, for femalea, the
hypothesis that Pof does not depend on LACiB and L2AOE ia accepted on a 5 x
level by a Lagrange multiplier teat (a teat etatiatic of 2.2 with critical
value x2i0.05`6.0).
A number of extenaíons and improvementa of the model certainly
deaerve more attention in future research. The apecification of
preferencea ia convenient but posaibly reatrictive. For inatance,-36-
preliminary analysis of a labour supply equation involving a quadratic
wage term, suggests a significant improvement. This extension would
correspond to the utility specification suggested by Hausman and Ruud
(1984). Another interesting example ia given by Heckman (19~4), who starts
with a specification of the indifference curves.
A second point relates to the treatment of the budget constraint
for non-workers. For them, the budget constraint is based on predicted
before tax wages. Random variation across individuals in before tax wages
is ignored. This calls for simultaneous estimation of a wage equation and
a labor supply equation. Examples of such models are Moffitt (1984), who
introduces houra dependent wage rates resulting in an S-shaped budget
curve, and ltimmers and Woittiez (1988), who combine Moffitt's model with
demend side restrictions. In the third place, the modelling of job offers
in a static framework has the merit of simplicity, but a more natural
approach would be to allow for consecutive job offers and the possibility
that individusls move from one job to another. Somewhat in the same spirit
it should be noted that budget constraints are not exogenous in a dynamic
world. For instance, the level of unemployment benefits in the Netherlands
often depends both on the duration of the preceding spell of employment
and on the duration of the current spell of unemployment.
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Appendix A: wage equations
In estimating the labour supply models of Sections 2 and 3, unknown
before-tax wage rates of non-workers were replaced by predicted wage
rates. Predictions are based on the following estimation results of the
log-wage equation. These were estimated following the Heckman procedure to
take account of possible selectivity bias. For both males and females, the
selectivity bias is not sígnificant. The meaning of the exogenous
variables is explained in Section 2 of the main text.
Table A.1 Wage equations
Males Females
Paremeter t-valuei) Parameter t-valuei)
Consr2~nt -5.96 2.75 -12.71 4.49
DED2 0.063 1.54 0.091 1.58
DED32) 0.144 3.93 0.160 3.24
DED42) 0.393 io.l0 0.468 8.11
LAGE 4.624 3.85 8-681 5.35
L2AGE -0.600 3.58 -1.214 5-25
EDSEC34j o.026 2.08 0.066 2.79
Lambda 1.379 1.39 -0.013 0.27
number of observ. 801 331
R-squared o.243 0.290
Explanation:
1) t-values are not corrected for the possible selectivity bias.
2) DED2, DED3, DED4: dummy variables referring to the levels of education
EDM (males) and EDF ( females), ranging from 1(lowest level) to 5
(highest level). DED2-1 if ED-2, DED3-1 if ED-3, DED4-1 if ED-4 or
ED-5.
3) EDSEC: index variable referring to the sector of education; EDSEC-2:
technical or business, EDSEC-1: semi-technical or semi-business,
EDSEC-o: neither technical nor business.
4) Lambda: the inverse of Mill's ratio.
Appendix B: Estimtion of the co-on ~odel using info~ation on workers
only
The model described in Section 2 was also estimated using information on
workers only, taking into account selectivity bias due to truncation by
using conditíonal maximum likelihood. Note that this estimation procedure
has the advantage that imputation of predicted wage rates for non-workers
is avoided. Estimation results are mentioned in Table A.2. Some of the
estimates are substantially different from those mentioned in Table 2.2,
referring to the estimation with use of both workers and non-workers.
These large differences strongly suggest that the common model is severely
misspecified.-39-
Table A.2 Estieation results of the ca~oon oodel; workers only
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Parameter Males Femalea
S (wage rate) 0.0 (---)- 0.91 (0.26)
b (unearned income) -0.0013 (0.0035) -0.0061 (0.0028)
ao (constant term) -154 (56) 25.1 (132)
al (LOGFS) 0.32 (0.90) -14.8 (2.6)
a2 (DCH(6) -0.17 (0.68) -0.97 (2.4)
a3 (LAGE) 109 (31) 21.0 (76.1)
a4 (L2AGE) -15.2 (4.3) -5.1 (10.8)
oE (random prefer.) 5.04 (11.6) 1.55 (4.98)
Q„ 4.30 (13.4) 10.53 (0.64)
Note: ': the estimate ia at i ts lower bound. This bound is imposed to
avoid coherency problems.
Simulations based on these reaults cen be compared with those mentioned in
Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Predicted participation for males is almost equsl to 1, as in Table 2.3. For females, the average simulated participation
probability equals o.957. which is quite out of line with both the actual sample participation and simulated participation in Table 2.3. The
estimated average wage and income elasticitiea of actuel working hours are
both 0.0 for males. For females, they are o.38 and -0.17 respectively.
Figures A.1 and A.2 are obtained in the seme way ea Figures 2.1 end 2.2 and can be used to compare the sample diatribution of actual working
hours with the aimulated distribution based on the eatimatea of Table A.2.
The figures show that excluding non-workers doea not solve the problem
that the spikes in the sample diatribution of actusl working hours are not
explained.-40-
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